How did an attacker steal $38,200 from Curve Finance's fee burner?

摘要:Curve Finance disclosed how an attacker exploited its fee burner to steal $38,200 through 138 forged trades, while user funds remained unaffected.

Curve Finance has disclosed that an attacker stole approximately $38,200 in DAO revenue on November 10 after exploiting a vulnerability in its Ethereum fee conversion contract through 138 unauthorized trades.

According to a security incident disclosure, the attacker exploited a flaw in the CowSwapBurner contract that allowed fraudulent trading orders to pass its signature verification checks. The stolen funds have not been recovered, although Curve confirmed that no user deposits, lending markets or crvUSD holdings were affected.

The exploit targeted administrative fees that Curve had already collected from its decentralized finance operations. The attacker diverted proceeds from token sales to an external wallet while the protocols regular weekly fee conversion continued normally.

How did the attacker exploit Curve Finances CowSwapBurner?

The vulnerability originated in the contracts isValidSignature function, which was responsible for approving trading orders submitted through CoW Protocol.

Curve explained that the function checked whether the order described in the signature data met its trading requirements, including selling tokens for crvUSD, directing proceeds to the FeeCollector and receiving at least 500 crvUSD.

However, the contract did not verify whether the description matched the actual order being executed. It ignored the order hash provided by CoW Protocol, allowing the attacker to attach details from a legitimate order to a completely different transaction.

With the contract already granting CoW Protocol unlimited allowances to spend its tokens, the attacker could submit unauthorized orders and redirect the proceeds to another address whenever the exchange window was open.

The first fraudulent transaction settled at 00:07 UTC on November 10, seven minutes after the weekly trading window opened. It sold the burner‘s YB token balance for USDC, with the proceeds sent directly to the attacker’s wallet.

The attacker reused the same legitimate order description to authorize another 137 transactions involving other tokens.

By 00:24 UTC, 133 fraudulent orders had settled, while the remaining five were completed over the following hours. The final unauthorized trade settled at 11:10 UTC.

Why were Curve Finances user funds unaffected?

Curves investigation found that the attacker had targeted accumulated administrative fee balances rather than assets deposited by users.

The protocol normally collects fees from its pools and markets before transferring them to a burner, which converts the tokens into crvUSD for distribution to the DAO.

Under the existing arrangement, fee tokens are transferred on Mondays, sold during a 24-hour window beginning Tuesday and distributed on Wednesdays.

Despite the exploit, 36 legitimate orders involving 35 tokens generated 97,317.74 crvUSD for the FeeCollector.

The attacker separately executed 138 forged orders involving 135 tokens, receiving 38,205.76 USDC.

According to Curve, most of the stolen balances had remained unsold because they were too small to meet the contracts minimum sale requirement of 500 crvUSD.

The median fraudulent order was worth approximately $254, and only two exceeded $500. Among previously traded tokens, the median time since their last sale was 161 days.

Curve reviewed all 6,558 orders settled through the burner since its June 2024 deployment and identified the 138 unauthorized transactions as the only ones whose proceeds were not delivered to the FeeCollector.

Curve has faced separate security incidents involving other parts of its infrastructure. In May 2025, crypto.news reported that the protocol had migrated to a new domain after a DNS hijacking attack redirected visitors to a malicious website.

More recently, the protocol faced a LlamaLend security incident in March 2026. Neither incident involved the fee conversion vulnerability disclosed in November.

Where did the stolen funds go?

Within four hours of the exploit, the attacker exchanged 37,611.76 USDC for ETH, distributed the funds across four addresses and bridged them to Arbitrum.

Approximately 37,229.89 USDC subsequently reached Hyperliquid, where the funds were exchanged for 65.41 XMR1, a Monero-linked asset.

Curve reported that the balance remained untouched as of November 16.

On November 15, the attacker converted the remaining 594 USDC into ETH and deposited 0.3 ETH into Tornado Cash.

Following an external vulnerability report on November 10, Curves Emergency DAO disabled fee collection and trading on Ethereum at 13:59 UTC. Similar precautionary measures followed on Arbitrum and Base at 16:55 UTC.

Ethereum fee conversion remains paused while fees continue to accumulate.

A DAO governance proposal, opened on November 13 and scheduled to close on November 20, seeks to replace the vulnerable burner with a descending-price auction system that verifies the actual order hash.

On November 17, the Emergency DAO transferred residual token balances from the old burner contracts on Ethereum, Base and Arbitrum back to their respective FeeCollector contracts.

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